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:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
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:

KENNETH GLENN ROBERTS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 910164
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
The parties agree that criminal defendants must be allowed
a meaningful opportunity to present complete defenses to the
criminal charges against them.
690 (1986).

See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,

See also opening brief of Appellant at 7-8 (same);

brief of Appellee at 4-5 (same).
The parties agree that in order to justify jury
instructions on the defense of compulsion, criminal defendants must
establish a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the
instructions.

See State v. Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981).

See also opening brief of Appellant at 10 n.4 (same); brief of
Appellee at 5-6 (same).
The sole issue in dispute before this Court is whether or
not Mr. Roberts is now entitled to muster the evidence of compulsion
in the trial court in an effort to justify giving an instruction on
the compulsion defense to a jury.

ARGUMENT
The State argues that Mr. Roberts is not entitled to
present a compulsion defense at all because defense counsel failed
to establish in the trial court the Lovercamp conditions on the
compulsion defense 1 discussed in State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630 (Utah
1986).

Brief of Appellee at 13 through 14.

A. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS CASE IS KEY TO
UNDERSTANDING WHY MR. ROBERTS MUST BE GIVEN A
MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH THE
COMPULSION DEFENSE IN THE TRIAL COURT.
The first and most important procedural consideration is
that defense counsel has never had full access to the evidence
necessary to formulate Mr. Roberts' compulsion defense.

Corrections

did not voluntarily produce necessary information in response to
defense counsel's discovery motions (T. 12-13), and the trial court

1. The conditions set forth in People v. Lovercamp, 43
Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1974), are:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific
threat of death, forcible sexual attack or
substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the
authorities or there exists a history of futile
complaints which make any result from such
complaints illusory;
(3) There is no time or opportunity to
resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or
violence used towards prison personnel or other
"innocent" persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the
proper authorities when he has attained a
position of safety from the immediate threat.
118 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
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quashed the subpoenas for the testimony of Corrections employees and
the subpoena duces tecum for the records concerning Corrections'
investigation of the aggravated assault and kidnapping (T. 20).
The second procedural consideration of importance is that
defense counsel had no notice that the viability of the compulsion
defense was going to be argued prior to the hearing wherein the
trial court ruled the defense unavailable as a matter of law.
Counsel for Corrections initiated that hearing and designated it as
a hearing on Corrections' motion to quash the subpoenas served on
Corrections employees, which motion argued that the subpoenas were
not personally served and that the subpoenas were not served in a
timely manner (R. 22-32).

The parties had discussed the compulsion

defense for months prior to this hearing without any dispute as to
the legal viability of the defense (T. 21). It was only after the
prosecutor interjected the opinion that Mr. Roberts should not be
able to "put on his little circus act in front of the jury" (T. 7-8)
that the viability of the defense became disputed.
The parties and the trial court never discussed Lovercamp
or Tuttle, or whether those prison escape cases were applicable to
this prison aggravated assault and kidnapping case.

The parties and

the trial court never discussed whether the Tuttle case, approving a
jury instruction in a prison escape compulsion case, can be applied
to preclude Mr. Roberts from mustering and presenting such a defense
at all.
Corrections has never opposed Mr. Roberts' presentation of
his defense.

At the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoenas,
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counsel for Corrections indicated that the Department of Corrections
had no intent to "harass or delay" Mr. Roberts' defense, but merely
wanted personal and timely service of the subpoenas on Corrections
employees (T. 3).

B. THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES DISCUSSED BY THE STATE
MUST BE INTERPRETED TO AFFORD MR. ROBERTS DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
On appeal, it is the State's contention that because
counsel for Mr. Roberts failed to articulate sufficient evidence to
justify a jury instruction on the compulsion defense at the hearing
on the motion to quash the subpoenas, before defense counsel had
access to all of the evidence necessary to the defense, Mr. Roberts
is not entitled to present a compulsion defense to a jury as a
matter of law.

Brief of Appellee at 6-15.

The majority of cases

the State relies on to support this position are inapposite to the
instant case because they involve criminal defendants who were
allowed to muster the evidence of their defenses in the trial court
before a jury, and who later raised issues on appeal concerning jury
instructions on the defenses.2

2. See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 110, 116 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1974) (trial court should have
given jury instruction on compulsion defense); State v. Harding, 635
P.2d 33, 36 (Utah 1981) (trial court had no obligation to instruct
on compulsion defense); State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah
1979) (trial court had no obligation to instruct on criminal
trespass); State v. Kearns. 219 S.E.2d 228, 231 (N.C. App. 1975)
(trial court had no obligation to instruct on coercion defense);
State v. Lamar, 698 P.2d 735, 742 (Ariz. App. 1984) (trial court had
no obligation to instruct on duress); State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630,
(footnote continued)
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State v. Pichon. 811 P.2d 517 (Kan. App. 1991), discussed
at page 10 of the State's brief, is distinguishable from the instant
case.

Pichon is an escape case, which turned on the defendant's

inability to show the fifth Lovercamp condition, that the defendant
reported to authorities upon obtaining safety from the threat
causing the escape.

Id. at 523.

Because Mr. Roberts' case is a

prison aggravated assault and kidnapping case, and not an escape
case, the fifth Lovercamp condition does not apply to Mr. Roberts'
defense.

Cf. State v. Little. 312 S.E.2d 695, 699 (N.C. App.),

review denied. 317 S.E.2d 915 (1984); opening brief of Appellant at
9 n.3; brief of Appellee at 14.
United States v. Campbell. 609 F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1979),
discussed at pages 6 and 12 of the State's brief, is also
distinguishable from the instant case, because the defendants in
Campbell were at least allowed to present evidence in support of the
compulsion defense to escape charges before one trial court refused
to instruct on the defense and the other trial court struck the
evidence that had been presented because it was insufficient to

(footnote 2 continued)
632-635 (Utah 1986) (jury instruction on duress was proper);
State v. Watts. 298 S.E.2d 436, 437 (N.C. App. 1982) (trial court
had no obligation to instruct on duress).
In United States v. Ortiz. 804 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1986),
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
defendant's request to submit an entrapment defense for the jury's
consideration. Id. at 1163. It appears that the trial court heard
all evidence available prior to making this ruling, as is a standard
procedure in entrapment cases. Id. at 1166.
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support the defense.

Id. at 924.3

In the instant case, the trial

court barred Mr. Roberts from presenting the defense before defense
counsel, let alone the trial court, had access to the evidence
necessary to the defense.
The only case the State relies on that is procedurally
analogous to this case is State v. Little, 312 S.E.2d 695 (N.C.
App.), review denied, 317 S.E.2d 915 (1984), discussed at pages 10
through 12 of the State's brief.

In Little, as in this case,

subpoenas necessary to the compulsion defense were quashed, no jury
was ever selected, and the trial court ruled the compulsion defense
unavailable as a matter of law.

Id. at 697. As is discussed at

pages 9 and 10 of Mr. Roberts' opening brief, Little is
distinguishable from this case, because the "compulsion" defense and
subpoenas in Little generally complained of the entire prison system
and all prison conditions.

The Little court explained,

The "defendants' subpoena seeking records of the
Department of Corrections relating to the
defense" required the production of all records
concerning weapons found and/or confiscated,
incident reports concerning assaults on inmates
by other inmates, and records containing
complaints by inmates of emotional or mental
problems related to abuse or injury suffered by

3. In Campbell, the appellate court upheld the trial
courts' refusal to produce witnesses to support the defendants'
testimony concerning the compulsion defense. The affidavits
supporting the motions to produce the witnesses were insufficient
because they showed that the witnesses requested could not provide
sufficient testimony to justify the compulsion defense. Id. at
925. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, governing the issuance of
the subpoenas at issue in this case, makes no requirement that
counsel proffer the evidence anticipated from the subpoenaed
witnesses and documents.
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those inmates as a result of actions of other
inmates. Yet, at the hearing on the State's
motion to quash defendants' subpoena, the
defendants presented no evidence to establish
their personal connection with the incidents in
the subpoenaed records. None of the defendants
testified at the hearing. And the prison
officials called by the defendants to testify
about the records they maintained were not asked
if the defendants themselves had made any
complaints.
Id. at 698.
In contrast, Mr. Roberts' subpoenas sought information
about the records, events and people directly relating to
Mr. Roberts and the crimes at issue in this case (T. 14-18).

It is

the intention of defense counsel to properly serve the subpoenas and
then to cull from this information the specific and imminent threats
compelling Mr. Roberts at the time of the aggravated assault and
kidnapping.
The State argues that counsel for Mr. Roberts failed to
show Lovercamp conditions (1) and (3), "that he was coerced by the
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him
or a third person," and "that he did not have time or opportunity to
resort to the courts."

Brief of Appellee at 13-14.

There are three reasons defense counsel's arguments
concerning the defense do not parrot Lovercamp.

First, the

Lovercamp conditions approved by this Court in Tuttle as elements of
a compulsion jury instruction in a prison escape case are not
naturally applied to block the preparation and presentation of a
compulsion defense in this prison aggravated assault and kidnapping
case.

Second, the parties and trial court in this case were not
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discussing Lovercamp or Tuttle at the hearing on the motion to quash
the subpoenas.

Third, defense counsel had no notice that

Mr. Roberts' rights to present his defense would be argued in the
hearing on Corrections' motion to quash the subpoenas, which motion
was based on the lack of personal service and the untimeliness of
the subpoenas.
Even if the State had given defense counsel sufficient
notice that Mr. Roberts' entire defense was at stake, and assuming
that the Lovercamp/Tuttle jury instruction elements could properly
apply to completely block a compulsion defense in a prison
aggravated assault and kidnapping case, because defense counsel had
not had access to Corrections' evidence necessary to Mr. Roberts'
defense, defense counsel was in no position to articulate the
defense.
Further, it appears that this Court has not adopted
Lovercamp condition (3), concerning a lack of opportunity to resort
to the courts.
such factor.

The jury instruction approved in Tuttle contained no

State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 632 n.3 (Utah 1986).

It seems that factor (3), concerning a lack of opportunity to resort
to the courts, is implicit in and would be found in any case
involving factors (1) and/or (2), concerning a specific and imminent
threat, and a lack of opportunity for complaint or a history of
futile complaints to authorities.
In sum, all of the cases relied on by the State must be
applied in the procedural context of this case to afford Mr. Roberts
an opportunity to muster all evidence necessary to his defense.
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Counsel for Mr. Roberts should be allowed to garner all relevant
evidence after the proper service of the subpoenas for the testimony
of Corrections officials involved with Mr. Roberts and after proper
service of the subpoena duces tecum for the records of the Inspector
General's investigation of the kidnapping and assault.
brief of Appellant at 7-11.

Opening

Only in these circumstances will

Mr. Roberts have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense, as is required by due process of law.

E.g. Crane v.

Kentucky; State v. Harding, supra.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's order barring
the presentation of Mr. Roberts' compulsion defense, and remand this
case to the trial court so that defense counsel can obtain and
muster all relevant evidence in support of Mr. Roberts' defense.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this # &

day of January, 1992.

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Mr.^Roberts

ELIZABETH'
OOK
Attorney for Mir. Roberts
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this I3JJL day of January, 1992.

DELIVERED by
this

day of January, 1992.
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APPENDIX 1

TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Rule 14. Subpoena.
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of
a witness or interpreter before a court,
magistrate or grand jury in connection with a
criminal investigation or prosecution may be
issued by the magistrate with whom an information
is filed, the county attorney on his own
initiative or upon the direction of the grand
jury, or the court in which an information or
indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the
court in which a case is pending shall issue in
blank to the defendant, without charge, as many
signed subpoenas as the defendant may require.
(b) A subpoena may command the person to
whom it is directed to appear and testify or to
produce in court or to allow inspection of
records, papers or other objects. The court may
quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would
be unreasonable.
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person
over the age of 18 years who is not a party.
Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the
subpoena to the witness or interpreter personally
and notifying him of the contents. A peace
officer shall serve any subpoena delivered to him
for service in his county.
(d) Written return of service of a subpoena
shall be made promptly to the court and to the
person requesting that the subpoena be served,
stating the time and place of service and by whom
service was made.
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance of
a witness from anywhere in the state.
(f) When a person required as a witness is
in custody within the state, the court may order
the officer having custody of the witness to
bring him before the court.
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without
reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of the
court responsible for its issuance.
(h) Whenever a material witness is about to
leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as to
afford reasonable grounds for believing that he
will be unable to attend a trial or hearing,
either party may, upon notice to the other, apply
to the court for an order that the witness be

examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance
of the witness at the deposition may be compelled
by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at
the deposition and the court shall make whatever
order is necessary to effect such attendance.

